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MICHIGAN LA,;y REVIEW

PRICE DISCRIMINATIONS AND THEIR JUSTIFICATIONS
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT OF 1936*
John T. Haslettt

T

HE Robinson-Patman Act was approved by the President on
June 19, 1936. The purpose of the act was to amend section 2
of the Clayton Act, which prohibited price discriminations in interstate commerce. Congress, by amending section 2 of the Clayton Act,
broadened the scope of the section by extending its purposes and prohibitions to price discriminations not formerly covered and by prohibiting other forms of discrimination which give favored purchasers
undue cost advantages over their non-favored competitors. It also
reduced the extent of requisite competitive injury.
When the act was passed, there was considerable debate as to its
~timate significance to business management. It was apparent that
any seller marketing goods of like grade and quality in interstate commerce at different prices was in danger of being in violation of section
2 (a) of the act. Brokerage fees, discounts, allowances, or other forms
of compensation paid by sellers to buyers, to buyers' agents, intermediaries acting for buyers, or buyer-controlled intermediaries, were
prohibited by the act. It was also apparent that the act required equality of treatment in furnishing services or facilities, or paying for them,
where the seller's customers were in competition one with the other.
Buyers who knowingly induced or received discriminations in price
prohibited by section 2 were guilty of violating the act as was the seller
who granted such discrimi'nations.
At the passage of the act some believed that section 2{ a) might
be interpreted to require all sellers uniformly to maintain a single
price plan of sale, thus displacing much of the pricing discretion of
management and destroying one of the most relied-upon sales techruques.
After eleven years the fears of the act's antagonists are far from
realized. Neither the Fede,ral Trade Commission nor the courts have
interpreted section 2 (a) of the act as so universally applicable to all
sellers in every situation that all price differentials are per se unlawful
and can be condemned without separate regard to the competitive

*

For a more comprehensive discussion see writer's paper presented at the Symposium on the Robinson-Patman Act before The Chicago Bar Association, January 24,

1947.
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factors in each situation. The commission and the courts have applied
themselves to determining which competitive conditions condemn price
discriminations under certain circumstances and which extenuate them
under others.
It is believed that the immediate objective of the Federal Trade
Commission in manifesting the significance of section 2 (a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act is to overcome a recent adverse decision of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Morton Salt Co. v. Federal Trade
C ommission.1 This decision reversed the commission on the matter of
requisite competitive effect and on the matter of burden of proof. Its
overruling of earlier precedents developed by the commission has
regenerated many issues as to the meaning of section 2 (a) and has
unsettled the interpretation and practical significance of this subsection ·
of the act.
The year 1948 promises to be important for Robinson-Patman Act
interpretation from the standpoint of two other cases now before the
courts. The Standard Oil case,2 pending in the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, will clarify the act's application to wholesalers and will
determine whether the meeting of an equally low price of a competitor
in good faith is a substantive defense to a violation of section 2 (a) of
the act. The Cement Institute case,8 now before the Supreme Court
for decision, involves, in part, the applicatio~ of the Robinson-Patman
Act to the basing point system of pricing when used by individual
sellers and when used by sellers collectively, but it is doubtful how
far the decision in this case will clarify the Robinson-Patman Act's interpretation in this respect. Recently the Supreme Court, in Bruce's
Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co.,4 held that a seller's violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act is no defense by a buyer to an
action for the purchase price of merchandise.
Thus the Robinson-Patman Act in its twelfth year of existence is in
a very important period of judicial review and construction. The exact
significance of the act to business management cannot yet be told.
Careful appraisal of the construction placed upon it to date by the
Federal Trade Commission and the courts, however, reveals some
points as to which its applicability has been conclusively settled. Such
1

(C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 102 F. (2d) 949, cert. granted Jan. 12, 1948.
Case No. 9211, C.C.A. 7th, F.T.C. Docket No. 4389, modified order issued
Aug. 9, 1946.
'
8
Federal Trade Commission v. The Cement Institute, Nos. 23-34, October Term,
1947, Supreme Court of the United States; Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 157 F. (2d) 533, 37 F.T.C. 87 (1943).
4
330 U.S. 743, 67 S.Ct. 1015 (1947).
2
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appraisal increases appreciation of the factors of contention which in
these coming months will determine the ultimate significance of the
act and which might yet eventually lead to that universality of applica-.
tion apprehended by some persons when the act was passed.

I
2(a)
Section 2(a) of the amended Clayton Act (the Robinson-Patman
Act), 5 omitting•its Pr0visos, now reads as follows:
SEcTiON

"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly,
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within
the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the juris, diction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them...."
The elements of a violation under this section consist of: ( r) commerce, (2) discrimination in price, and (3) effect on competition.

r. Commerce
The scope of the federal commerce power in the matter of price
discriminations, and the extent to which Congress has exercised that
power in the Robinson-Patman Act, have been liberally_construed. In
contrast with its decision concerning section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act,6 the Supreme Court h?-s decided that the RobinsonPatman Act applies both to price discriminations in interstate commerce
and to those outside interstate commerce which affect or obstruct it.7
The Supreme Court was guided by a quite clearly indicated intention
of Congress relative to the jurisdictional scope of the act. Section 2 (a)
49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1940) § 13, as amended.
Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 61 S.Ct. 580
(1941).
7 Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726, 65
s.~t. 961 (1945).
5

6

453

PRICE DISCRIMINATION

of the Robinson-Patman Act applies "where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce." In connection with this provision it was explained to the House of Representatives that its purpose was to ensure:
" . . . extending the protections of this bill against the full
evil of price discrimination, whether immediately in interstate or
intrastate commerce, wherever it is of such a character as tends
directly to burden or affect interstate commerce." 8
Two United States district courts have held that the federal commerce power has a broad extent in the matter of price discriminations
under the Robinson-Patman Act.9 Both district courts have held the
act applicable to sales of gasoline to wholesalers and retailers after shipment from another state and temporary storage awaiting sale. On
the other hand, a third district court has held the act inapplicable to
the retail sales of a local branch maintained by an out-of-the-state
manufacturer.10
2. Discrimination in price

.

The act contains no definition of the word "discrimination." The
meaning of "discrimination" under the Robinson-Patman Act was expressed to Congress by Congressman Utterback, Chairman of the
House of Representatives' Subcommittee on the Patman Bill, as follows:
"In its meaning as simple English a discrimination is more
than a mere difference. Underlying the meaning of the word is,
the idea that some relationship exists between the parties to the
discrimination which entitles them to equal treatment, whereby
the difference granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage
upon the other. If the two are competing in the resale of the
goods concerned, that relationship exists. Where, also, the price
to one is so low as to involve a sacrifice of some part of the seller's
necessary costs and profit as applied to that business, it leaves that
deficit inevitably to be made up in higher prices to his other customers; and there, too, a relationship may exist upon which to
base the charge of discrimination." 11
8

H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 8 (1936).
Alabama Independent Service Station Assn. v. Shell Petroleum Corp., (D.C. Ala.
1939) 28 F. Supp. 386; Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., (D.C. Ill. 1941)
41 F. Supp. 436.
10
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Jarrett, (D.C. Ga. 1942) 42 F. Supp. 723.
11
So CoNc. REc. 9416 (1936).
9
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The cases to date have substantiated Congressman Utterback's
definition, and have developed certain elaborations upon it. Whereas
the definition speaks of a relationship between the purchasers involved,
the act is also concerned with the relationship between the seller and his
own competitors, known as "primary line" competition.
A price discrimination, for purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act,
may be summarized as a difference in price, primarily the seller's
responsibility,12 which is effectuated under competitive conditions existing either between the seller and other sellers, between the favored
purchaser and other purchasers, or between customers of any of such
purchasers. Every difference in price is not necessarily a discrimination.18
(a) Primary line competition. The act prohibits differences under
circumstances where the effect may be to injure a seller's own competitors. This position has been sustained by the courts in three decisions.14 The pending Cement Institute case,111 and many others in the
delivered price field, also concern first-line competition.
A seller is prohibited under section 2 (a) of the statute from lowering his price in a certain market, or markets, for the purpose of eliminating a competitor, while at the same time maintaining a higher price in
other markets where the competition of the competitor is not encountered.16 This is the significance of the Muller and Metz cases.17 The
Moss case 18 concerns unlawful discriminations granted favored purchasers within given markets. In these cases the commission attacked
the discriminations because of their injurious effect on the seller's own
competitors, and the courts in the Muller and Moss cases sustained
the commission's position in this regard.
12 The writer believes that in some instances a seller's price may be fixed by
the buyer who knowingly induces and receives a discrimination in price in violation of
section 2(f) of the act.
18 This is similar to the interpretation placed 'upon the word "discrimination"
under the Interstate Commerce Act. McCollester, "Section 2(b)," N.Y. STATE BAR
AssN. RoBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYMPOSIUM 23 at 26 (1946).
14 E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 142
F. (2d) 5n, 33 F.T.C. 24 (1941); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 155 F. (2d) 1016, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 378,
36 F.T.C. 640 (1943); Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., (D.C. Ill. 1941)
41 F. Supp. 436.
111 Nos. 23-34, October Term, 1947, Supreme Court of the United States.
16 This is expressly forbidden. by § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. L.
1526 at 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1940) § 13a.
17 E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 142
F. (2d) 5n; Metz Bros. Baking Co., 30 F.T.C. 268 (1939).
18 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 155 F. (2d) 1016, modifying 148 F. (2d) 378.
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(b) Second and third line competition
( r) What constitutes second and third line competition? Second
line competition is that which exists between customers of a given
seller. A large percentage of the proceedings brought by the Federal
Trade Commission under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act
have involved second line competition. Third line competition is that
which involves customers of such purchasers.
Parties are competitors for purposes of the act if each is attempting
to resell the goods in question within the same marketing area to
the same general class of customers. This is true, even though one
such party may market through a cash and carry super-market, another
may market through a neighborhood outlet featuring delivery services, and, according to two recent Federal Trade Commission proceedings, a third may market through vending machines.19 In a recent case
it was argued that ball park concessionaires are competitors of ordinary
candy retailers.20
It is not necessary that two purchasers compete in direct resale of
the goods concerned in order to be in competition within the meaning
of the act. They are in competition if they compete in the sale of
products manufactured in part from the goods concerned.21 Nor need
purchasers be located in the same cities in order to be in competition
within the meaning of the act. Manufacturers in different cities may
market their products in nation-wide competition. Wholesalers and
retailers in different cities may compete in overlapping territories, or
may compete against chain stores, mail order houses, and similar organizations.22
(2) Functional classification. Functional discounts are those given
wholesalers, retailers, and other types of distributors according to their
respective distributive functions. The position of the Federal Trade
Commission appears to be that such discounts are not discriminatory
19
Morton Salt Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 162 F.
(2d) 949, affirming 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944), order modified April 14, 1945. See
Brief for Respondent, p. 29; see also Brief for Respondent, p. 12, Bruce's Juices, Inc.
v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 67 S.Ct. 1015 (1947). Concerning vending
machines: Curtiss Candy Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4673, order issued November 12,
1947; Automatic Canteen Co. of America, F.T.C. Docket No. 4933, complaint issued
March 19, 1943.
20
Brief for Commission, pp. I I ff., 23 ff., Curtiss Candy Co., ibid.
21
Com Products Refining Co., 324 U.S. 726, 65 S.Ct. 961 (1945), affirming
34 F.T.C. 850 (1942).
22
Com Products Refining Co., ibid; Agricultural Laboratories, 26 F.T.C. 296
(1938).
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within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act, because the recipients are not in competition with purchasers performing other functions who do not receive them. 28
Many purchasers perform dual functions of both a wholesaler
and retailer nature. In such situations, according to the commission in
several cases,2" sellers may grant discounts only on such part of a
purchaser's business actually performed under the function for which
the discount is accorded. In the.Standard Oil case,25 the commission
found that Standard Oil was granting wholesaler prices to four "jobbers," w,ho, in addition to their wholesale business, were operating
retail service stations for the sale of gasoline to the public. The commission ordered Standard Oil to cease granting the . wholesaler discount to such jobbers on the gasoline being resold at retail.
This matter entails a serious problem as to how a seller is going to
keep combined wholesaler-retailers from reselling, at retail, articles
which have been bought under a wholesaler discount. The seller can
either refuse to sell to all such distributors, or can sell to them entirely
on a retailer price basis. It is also probable that he can continue to sell
to such distributors on a dual-price basis, and vindicate himself under
the act, if he requires good faith proof as to the amount of each
such distributor's purchases procured for resale at wholesale and the
amount procured for resale at retail. 26
23
The commission has reviewed functional discounts in several cases, but has never
held them unlawful per se. See cases cited in note 24, infra. For discussion of validity
of functional discounts under section 2 of the Clayton act prior to its amendment, and
of legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act concerning functional discounts, see
Shniderman, " 'The Tyranny of Labels'_.:_A Study of Functional Discounts under the
Robinson-Patman Act," 60 HARV. L. REV. 571 (1947). Arbitrary customer classification in order to justify different prices is no doubt unlawful if the purchasers are
performing the same function and are seeking to sell the product to the same general
class of customers.
But see discussion of Standard Oil case, infra, p. 461.
24
Standard Oil Co., Case No. 92u, C.C.A. 7th, F.T.C. Docket No. 4389,
modified order issued August 9, 1946; American Art Clay Co., 38 F.T.C. 463
(1944); Hansen Inoculator Co., Inc., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938); Nitragin Co., Inc.,
26 F.T.C. 320 (1938); Urbana Laboratories, 26 F.T.C. 312 (1938); Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25 (1943); Nutrine Candy Co., 30 F.T.C. u5 (1939);
American Oil Co., 29 F.T.C. 857 (1939).
25
Ibid.
26
The findings and order to cease and desist in Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C.
25 at 65 ff. (1943), indicate that a seller must be critical in his acceptance of purchasers' evidence as to business done under each of more than one function. See also
Shniderman, "'The Tyranny of Labels'-A Study of Functional Discounts under the
Robinson-Patman Act," 60 HARV. L. REV. 571 at 601 (1947). As to whether a
seller may conflict with the Sherman Act in efforts to keep wholesaler-retailers from
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A related problem is that of granting functional discounts to wholesalers who are owned by retailers with whom they do part or all of
their business, and vice versa. 27 The situation is similar to that of
combined wholesaler-retailers except that two separate entities are
involved. The problem is likewise similar to that of the brokerage
cases under section 2 ( c) of the act and probably can be resolved on
the basis of decisions un_der that section, as well as on the basis of
the Standard Oil case. If a wholesaler is owned IOO per cent by a
given retailer, or if both are IOO per cent owned by the same financial
interest, the real party in interest receives a price advantage in the
retail business on goods purchased at the wholesale price and resold
through the retail outlets. Where there are different degrees of ownership of the wholesaler or of the retailer, the question becomes more
difficult of ascertainment. Such cases would seem to be determined
by the cases under section 2(c) which hold that if brokerage payments
in any way ultimately accrue to the benefit of buyers, or of any party
financially interested in such buyers, the payments are unlawful. 28
( c) Undue burden of costs. In Congressman Utterback's hereinabove quoted definition he speaks of a price to one purchaser being
so low as to cast an undue burden of costs on other purchasers or
classes of purchasers. This is exemplified in the recently amended
complaint against Champion Spark Plug Company.29 The complaint
alleges:
" ... customers who have paid 2I cents ... per plug have
been compelled to thereby .subsidize in part other buyers who
paid respondent only 6 cents per plug.... Therefore, respondent's
practice of selling its spark plugs for original equipment below
cost places upon its purchasers of spark plugs for replacement the
abusing functional discounts, see Van Cise, "Functional Prices," N.Y. STAT.E BAR
AssN., RoBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYMPOSIUM 89 at 102 (1947).
27
This is well illustrated by Paragraph 17, D, of the complaint in SherwinWilliams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25 (1943). However, the commission dismissed this section
of the complaint without prejudice.
28 Webb-Crawford Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 5th, 1940) 109
F. (2d) 268, cert. den., 310 U.S. 638, 60 S.Ct. 1080 (1940), affirming 27 F.T.C.
1099 (1938); Modern Marketing Service, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A.
7th, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 970, affirming 37 F.T.C. 386 (1943); Reeves Parvin & Co.,
28 F.T.C. 1429 (1939); Reed-Harlin Grocer Co., 33 F.T.C. 1114 (1941); Thomas
Page Mill Company, Inc., 33 F.T.C. 1437 (1941); Miles Brokerage Co., 33 F.T.C.
1580 (1941); Parr Sales Co., 31 F.T.C. 1286 (1940).
29
F.T.C. Docket No. 3977, complaint issued December 16, 1939, amended June
27, 1937. See also General Motors Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. 3886, complaint issued
Sept. 8, 1939.
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unjust •.• burden qf paying a price made higher ... so as to
carry the loss ... on the said •.. sales at 6 cents per plug."
This theory of di.scrimination has received little development up
to the present time. The theory has been suggested in certain of the
delivered price cases.80 . Its potentialities are significant for those situations in which sellers discriminate between consumers who are not
actually in competition with each other.
(d) Indirect discrimination in price. The act, by its own terms,
covers price discriminations which are effectuated by indirect means,
as well as those made directly. The Supreme Court has· held that
terms of sale are covered by the act where their effect is indirect discrimination in price.81 In that instance tJie discriminations resulted
from allowing certain purchasers more time to talce up favorable
options. Other types of· indirect discrimination considered. in other
cases include: free goods given to purchasers,22 free goods given to customers of purchasers,88 freight allowances,84 privilege of returning
deteriorated goods,85 and excessive payments for purported services.86
( e) Discrimination in "mill net'' price. A controversial issue concerns the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to delivered prices.
, It is disputed whether the act is concerned with actu~l delivered prices
or is concerned, instead, with sellers' "mill net" realizations at their
80

See infra, note 43.
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726, 65
S.Ct. 961 (1945).
82
Republic Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 701 (1941); National Grain Yeast Corp., 33
F.T.C. 684 (1941); Federal Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 1372 (1941).
88
Curtiss Candy Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4673, order issued November 12,
1947; Dentists Supply Go., 37 F.T.C. 345 (1945). This might be condemned
under § 2(e) of the act.
84 Agricultural Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.T.C. 296 (1938); Urbana Laboratories,
26 F.T.C. 312 (1938); Master Lock Co., 27 F.T.C. 982 (1938).
85 Agricultural Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.T.C. 296 (1938). Although condemned
by the Federal Trade Commission under § 2(a) of the act, this practice might be
prosecuted under § 2(e) of the act.
86
Curtiss Candy Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4673, order issued November 12,
1947; Miami Wholesale Drug Corp., 28 F.T.C. 485 (1939); Golf Ball Mfgrs.'
Assn., 26 F.T.C. 824 (1938). There is a tenuous line of demarcation between indirect price discriminations unlawful under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act and
discriminations unlawful under§ 2(d) and§ 2(e), relating to the payment for services
· or the rendering of services. It is argued by counsel for the commission in the Curtiss
case (Brief, p. 41) that § 2(d) is differentiated from § 2(a) in that § 2(d) is concerned with services for which there is reasonable compensation, while § 2(a) is concerned with excessive payments for services. Section 2(e) may be differentiated from
§ 2(a) in that § 2(a) is concerned with services which immediately affect price, such
as the allowance of free goods, while § 2(e) is concerned with less proximate services,
such as the furnishing of demonstrators or other sales aids•.
81
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factories, after deduction of actual transportation costs to each purchaser.87
Common: basing points and the concerted use of uniform delivered
price systems have been condemned in several decisions and pending
complaints by the Federal Trade Com.mission as instruments for the
suppression of price competition by members of an industry.88 Discriminatory "factory" or "mill net" returns, realized after deduction
of actual transportation expenses to each purchaser, have frequently
been discussed in these cases, but in none of them has the commission
ever relied specifically upon the "mill net" theory in holding the
systems unlawful.
Discriminations under the basing point·system of pricing, wholly
apart from agreement to maintain identical pricing, were enjoined by
the Federal Trade Commission under section 2(a) of the RobinsonPatman Act in the Corn Products 89 and A. E. Staley 40 cases. In each
87 For an excellent discussion of the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to
delivered prices, see following: Austern, "The Legal Geography of Price" (before
National Association of Purchasing Agents, June 3, 1947); Wooden, "The Delivered
Price, Generally," N.Y. STATE BAR AssN., RoBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYMPOSIUM 37
(1947), and Dunn, "The Validity of a Delivered Price," id. 13; Hinds, "Uniform
Delivered Prices under Section 2(a)," N.Y. STATE BAR AssN., RoBINSON-PATMAN
AcT SYMPOSIUM 83 (1946); and 55° YALE L. J. 558 (1946).
88 Under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act alone: Inter alia, National
Crepe Paper Assn. of America, 38 F.T.C. 282 (1944), affd., sub. nom. Fort Howard
Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 156 F. (2d) 899, cert.
den., 329 U.S. 795, 67 S.Ct. 481 (1946); Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute, 37
F.T.C. 419 (1943), affd., (C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 152 F. (2d) 478; United States
Maltsters Assn., 35 F.T.C. 797 (1942), order modified, 37 F.T.C. 342 (1943),
affd., (C.C.A. 7th, 1945) 152 F. (2d) 161; Salt Producers Assn., 34 F.T.C. 38
(1941), order affd. with modification, (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 354, order
modified 37 F.T.C. 339 (1943)'; Rigid Steel Conduit Assn., 38 F.T.C. 534 (1944),
petition for review Case No. 8644, C.C.A. 7th; Ferro Enamel Corp., F.T.C. Docket
No. 5155, order issued Feb. 26, 1946; American Iron and Steel Institute, F.T.C.
Docket No. 5508, complaint issued Aug. 16, 1947, amended Nov. 14, 1947. Under
§ 2(a) Robinson-Patman Act and § 5 Federal Trade Commission Act: Inter alia,
Cement Institute, Nos. 23-34, October Term, 1947, Supreme Court of the United
States; United Fence Manufacturers Assn., 27 F.T.C. 377 (1938); Cast Iron Soil
Pipe Assn., F.T.C. Docket No. 3091, complaint issued March 26, 1937; Chain Institute, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. 4878, complaint issued December 22, 1942; American
Refractories Institute, F.T.C. Docket No. 4900, complaint issued February 5, 1943;
National Lead Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 5253, complaint issued .November 25, 1944;
Clay Products Assn., F.T.C. Docket No. 5483, complaint issued February 14, 1947;
Clay Sewer Pipe Assn., F.T.C. Docket No. 5484, complaint issued February 14, 1947;
Corn Products Refining Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 5502, complaint issued June 24, 1947.
89
324 U.S. 726, 65 S.Ct. 961 (1945), affirming 34 F.T.C. 850 (1942).
40
Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U.S. 746,
65 S.Ct. 971 (1945); 34 F.T.C. 1362 (1942).
·
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case the Supreme Court referred, in part, to the discriminatory "mill
nets" received by Corn Products and Staley in their use of basing points
other than point of shipment, but ::iffirmed the commission's orders
on the ground that there were differences in the delivered prices, which
could not be justified by the sellers.
The "mill net" theory of price discrimination, thus, although frequently referred to, has not been, determinative in any of the cases
decided so far. 41 Its evident potentialities concerning the validity of
delivered price systems, however, cannot be discounted.
In this regard, it may be important that the commission has proceeded only twice against delivered price systems where such systems
were not used as instruments by sellers, acting in concert, to control
prices. In both cases, there was injury in the second line of competition, the respective purchasers being in competition with each other
on a nation-wide basis. Thus, unless second-line competition is affected,
the commission may be antagonistic to delivered ,price systems only
where they are a means of collusive price maintenance by sellers. Delivered price systems, independently arrived at and individually maintained by sellers, may in many industries be of no concern to the
Federal Trade Commission.42
Some caution is required in accepting this conclusion, ,however,
in view of the repeated assertion in recent complaints that the effect
of delivered price systems is to deprive nearby purchasers of their
natural freight advantages and to make such customers bear part of
the freight to distant purchasers.43 This is reflective of the "undue
41

The "mill net" theory of price discrimination has been raised in both the
pending Cement Institute case, Nos. 23-34, Oct. Term, 1947, Supreme Court of the
United States and the pending review of the Rigid Steel Conduit Assn. case, 38 F.T.C.
534 (1944), petition for review Case No. 8644, ·c.C.A. 7th. However, the commission's orders in both cases are directed against concerted action to maintain
"matched" delivered prices, and it is doubtful whether either case will bring a determination on the "mill net'' issue.
42 Dr. Corwin D. Edwards in his comments and discussion before the New York
State Bar Association, N.Y. STATE BAR AssN., RoBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYMPOSIUM
57 at 58 (1947), suggests that delivered price systems may be objectionable only
where they are instruments of collusion, except in the case of basing points, which
may be undesirable because of certain economic consequences of their use.
48
The Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute, 37 F.T.C. 419 (1943), affd., (C.C.A.
7th, 1946) 152 F. (2d) 478; Rigid Steel Conduit Assn., 38 F.T.C. 534 (1944),
petition for review Case No. 8644, C.C.A. 7th; American Iron and Steel Institute,
F.T.C. Docket No. 5508, complaint issued Aug. 16, 1947, amended Nov. 14, 1947;
Corn Products Refining Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 55oz, complaint issued June 24, 1947;
Chain Institute, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. 4878, complaint issued Dec. 22, 1942; Clay
Products Assn., F.T.C. Docket No. 5483, complaint issued Feb. 14, 1947; Clay Sewer
Pipe Assn., F.T.C. Docket No. 5484, complaint issued Feb. 14, 1947.
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burden of costs" theory, heretofore referred to, of Congressman Utterback. This language may portend a new inclination of the Federal
Trade Commission in the delivered price field, under which .few, if
any, delivered price systems could be absolved.
The commission's "mill net" theory, in such case, would come
into full play and would require a clear-cut determination by the courts.
Basing point delivered prices might be proceeded against without
reliance on the theory, but the uniform delivered price system could
only be invalidated by use of the theory. The decisive test may
eventuate out of any of a group of recent complaints, all of which
involve uniform delivered prices within given zones.4' 4
( f) Discrimination in price affecting third line competition. The
problem of discrimination affecting third line competition is among
the most challenging in the enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The act by its terms is specifically concerned with the effect on competition "with customers of either'' the seller or the purchaser. The
significance of this pr<;>vision from the Federal Trade Commission's
findings and orders, appears to be that there may be unlawful price
discrimination where a price difference exists between any person purchasing directly from a seller and a competitor of such person who purchases indirectly through a seller's customer.
The Standard Oil case 45 is important on this problem. The case
concerns Standard Oil's sales of gasoline to wholesalers at one and
one-half cents per gallon lower than sales to retailers. The wholesalers, in turn, resold the gasoline at prices which enabled their customers to obtain the gasoline at lower prices than retailers who purchased directly from Standard Oil. Standard Oil was ordered to cease
and desist from selling gasoline to wholesalers "at a price lower than
respondent charges its retailer-customers who in fact compete . . .
with the retailer customers of such jobbers or wholesalers," if the
wholesalers resell at lower prices to their retailer-customers than
charged by Standard Oil to its own retailer-customers.
The order appears to require the seller either to limit direct sales
44
Chain Institute, Inc., ibid; National Lead Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 5253, complaint issued Nov. 25, 1944; Corn Products Refining Co., F.T.C. No. 5502, complaint issued June 24, 1947; Clay Products Assn., ibid; Clay Sewer Pipe Assn., ibid.
45
Case No. 92II, C.C.A. 7th, F.T.C. Docket No. 4389, modified order issued
Aug. 9, 1946. For discussion of Standard Oil case on this problem, see Shniderman,
" 'The Tyranny of Labels'-A Study of Functional Discounts under the RobinsonPatman Act," 60 HARV. L. REV. 571 at 598 (1947) and Van Cise, "Functional
Prices," N.Y. STATE BAR AssN., ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYMPOSIUM 89 at 97, 102
(1947).
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to one class of customers alone; or else to stand ready to sell directly to
all retailers at the retail prices set by the wholesalers. This leaves the
pricing .initiative in the hands of the wholesalers. It may be possible
for the seller to retain the initiative and control the resale prices of the
wholesalers by the threat of withdrawing trade, but this would involve
serious risks under present construction of the Sherman and Federal
Trade Commission Acts, unless the Robinson-Patman Act is to be considered as making an exception to those acts.
The Morton Salt case 46 involved the converse situation. Morton
sold to certain large chain retailers at lower prices than it sold to
wholesalers. The result was that retailers buying through wholesalers
were required to pay higher prices for the salt than the chain retailers
who purchased directly. The order to cease and desist required Morton
to cease "selling such products to any retailer at prices lower than
prices charged wholesalers whose customers compete with such retailers." 47
,
•
An inevitable issue is whether there may be price discrimination
where wholesalers and retailers are sold at the same price. Customers
of the wholesalers must necessarily in this situation pay a higher price
for the article in question than retailers who purchase directly. While
it is true that there is no difference in the seller's own prices, the price
difference which is important is that which exists between the competing retailers who purchase directly and those who purchase indirectly
through the wholesalers. It is to be noted, however, that the order
in the Morton Salt case leaves open this very type of situation. Thus,
if sustained, the order may be authority for the proposition that the
act does not apply to situations in which the seller grants the same
price to wholesalers and retailers. The case of Bird and Son, Inc. 48
appears to be authority to the same effect.
It is believed, however, that sellers who sell to both wholesalers
and retailers at •the same price must hold themselves out to accept
orders from all retailers who seek to purchase directly and who comp~te with retailer customers of the wholesalers. It is possible that the
right to purchase directly from a seller in such circumstances may be
a "service" or "facility" which under section 2 ( e) of the :act, must be
accor~ed on proportionally equal terms to all purchasers. Likewise,
46
(C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 949, affirming 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944), order
modified April 14, 1945.
47
See also C. F. S~uer Co., 33 F.T.C. 812 (1941); Curtiss Candy Co., F.T.C.
Docket No. 4673, order issued November 12, 1947.
48
25 F.T.C. 548 (1937).
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it may be that the act requires a seller to accept direct orders from all
would-be direct purchasers where the result otherwise would be price
inequality among such purchasers. Section 2 (a) of the RobinsonPatman Act provides:
" ... Nothing herein contained shall prevent presons engaged
in selling goods, wares, or merchap.dise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade...."
·
The· implication from this is that the statute does prevent a selection of customers where such selection is in "restraint of trade." Where
a seller's policy is an effort to realize favorable prices to large customers, it is probable that this favoritism, violating the spirit of the
Robinson-Patman Act, is, for purposes of the act, in "restraint of
trade."
(g) Seller's final responsibility for price difference. The Federal
Trade Commission has indicated in certain decisions that price differentials are not discriminations within the meaning of the RobinsonPatman Act if non-favored purchasers hav_e had equal opportunity to
receive the favorable prices on fair terms, but have failed to take advantage of them for reasons of their own. In the Kraft-Phenix case 49
the commission upheld a quantity discount offered purchasers who
ordered a certain quantity of cheese and salad dressings equal to a
two or three weeks' supply for a small grocer. The commission said:
" ... a retailer who wishes to do so may safely buy a two or ·
three weeks' supply at one time without fear of spoilage.
"Althpugh, even under these conditions, an appreciable number of retailers do not obtain the discount, the Commission does
not believe that the respondent is required by law to make no
distinction between these and other retailers. . . ." 80
Reflecting, in part, the above principle, there has been little question under the act about the validity of "cash discounts." These discounts are granted for payment within a designated time, and are customarily offered to all purchasers alike. 51 Similarly, "unit delivery
discounts"-those based on quantities delivered at a given time-have
49

25 F.T.C. 537 (1937).
Id. at 544 (1937). See also American Optical Co. case, 28 F.T.C. 169 (1939).
81
In the following cases cash discounts were held unlawful, because offered to
· certain purchasers and not to others: Republic Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 701 (1941);
National Grain Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 684 (1941); Federal Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C.
1372 (1941).
•

•

80
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been little affected by the act. If the quantity limits. are not large, all
purchasers are ordinarily in equal position to take advantage of the
discounts. Unit delivery discounts are probably also justifiable under
other provisions of the statute.52
Discounts are commonly granted on the basis of aggregate volume
of purchases placed with sellers over given periods of time. These socalled "quantity discounts"· have been consistently regarded as discriminatory in most situations by the Federal Trade Commission~53
Only in rare circumstances, such as those of the_ Kraft case, can ag• gregate quantity limits be set effectively within the capacity of smaller
competitors to attain.
The Morton Salt Company took issue with the commission concerning standard quantity discounts before the Circuit Court of Appeals.5' The company argued that standard quantity discounts are not
discriminatory, because they are made known to all purchasers and are
made available on conditions beyond· a seller's control. There is language in the court's opinion which might sustain the company's argument, but no specific determination was made on the point.
The commission has reflected the Kraft principle, but with questionable significance~ in its emphasis in many of the quantity discount
cases. The commission has condemned the practice of allowing separate
purchasers to combine their purchases for the purpose of qualifying for
quantity discounts. 55 It has also disapproved discounts based on the
aggregate purchases of members of buyer cooperatives,56 or on the
lnfra, "Justifications Under the § 2(a) Provisos." Several economi~ advantages
of unit delivery discounts are demonstrated in De Birny, "Price Discrimination under
the Robinson-Patman Act," (before Annual Convention of National Preservers Association, January 20, 1941), citing W.H.S. Stevens.
.
53 H. C. Brill Co., Inc., 26 F.T.C. 666 (1938); Morton Salt Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 949, affirming 39 F.T.C. 35
(1944); Standard Brands, Inc., 30 F.T.C. II17 (1940); American Optical Co., 28
F.T.C. 169 (1939); C. F. Sauer Co., 33 F.T.C.. 812 (1941); Simmons Co., 29
F.T.C. 727 (1939); Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25 (1943); National Biscuit
Co., 38 F.T.C. 213 (1944); Caradine Hat Co., 39 F.T.C. 86 (1944); Ferro Enamel
Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. 5155, order issued Feb. 26, 1946; John B. Stetson Co.,
F.T.C. Docket No. 5172, order issued Oct. 8, 1945; Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4920, order isued January 26, 1948; International Salt
Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4307, complaint issued Sept. 9, 1940; Jacques Kreisler Mfg.
Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 5446, complaint issued June 17, 1946.
54
Morton Salt Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 949, affirming 39 F.T.C.
35 (1944), order modified April 14, 1945.
55 Morton Salt Co., ibid.; International Salt Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4307, complaint issued September 9, 1940; C. F. Sauer Co., 33 F.T.C. 812 (1941); MinneapolisHoneywell Regulator Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4920, order issued January 26, 1948.
56
Standard Brands, Inc., 30 F.T.C. lII7 (1940); Simmons Co., 29 F.T.C. 727
52
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aggregate purchases of several principals acting through buying
agents; n and those discounts which have been offered chain organizations on the basis of aggregate purchases of all units of such chains,
rather than on the basis of separate purchases of each unit. 58 The result
of compliance with these objections of the commission would be greater
equality among purchasers in qualifying for the quantity discounts
concerned. This, however, would by no means assure that the dis:..
counts were so accessible to small purchasers that small purchasers
could have free volition in the matter of taking advantage of the discounts or of passing them up.
(h) Goods of like grade and quality. Price differentials do not
constitute discriminations prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act unless they exist on articles of "like grade and quality." Goods are probably of like grade and quality, not only where they conform to the
same specifications, but also where, though not of the same specifica.:..
tions, they give substantially identical performance and are held out
'by the seller as of the same quality.
The Federal Trade Commission now has before it the question
whether the designation of different brand names for goods of like
grade and quality differentiates such goods into goods of separate grade
and quality. According to two pending complaints, goods of like quality
sold under different brands must be sold at the same price. 59 This is
also true as to good~ sold for distribution under purchasers' private
brands.60
The commission has held that where goods of like grade and quality
are sold in different sizes or types of package, the privilege of buying
each size or package is a "service" or "facility," which, under section
2 ( e) of the act must be accorded to all purchasers on proportionally
, equal terms. 61 It may be that, by the same principle, all purchasers
(1939); Caradine Hat Co., 39 F.T.C. 86 (1944); Jacques Kreisler Mfg. Co., F.T.C.
Docket No. 5446, complaint issued June 17, 1946.
57 Simmons Co., ibid.
58
Standard Brands, Inc., 30 F.T.C. 1117 (1940); C. F. Sauer Co., 33 F.T.C.
812 (1941); Simmons Co., ibid; Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25 (1943);
Morton Salt Co. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 949, affirming 39 F.T.C.
35 (1944); National Biscuit Co., 38 F.T.C. 213 (1944); John B. Stetson Co., F.T.C.
Docket No. 5172, order issued Oct. 8, 1945.
59
Hood Rubber Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4971, complaint issued June 1, 1943;
U.S. Rubber Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4972, complaint issued June 1, 1943.
60
U.S. Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939); U.S. Rubber Co., F.T.C. Docket
No. 4972, complaint issued June 1, 1943; Hood Rubber Co., ibid; Hansen Inoculator
Co., Inc., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938).
61
Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658 (1940).
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must be given "proportionally equal" opportunity to buy each of a
seller's different brands, thus preventing the restriction of popular
brands to favored purchasers. It was asserted during the .Congressional
hearings on the Patman Bill that all purchasers must have equal opportunity to purchase under private brands.62

3. Effect on competition
Price discriminations are not unlawful under the Robinson-Patman
Act unless their effect "may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition...."
Congress augmented the earlier philosophy of the antitrust acts
concerning requisite competitive effect, by adding to the language of
the Robinson-Patman Act the phrase "to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition." No longer was it necessary to prove that competition
had been substantially burdened in any line of commerce, and no
longer was the status of competition a primary matter of concern, as
under .the Sherman Act and earlier interpretations of the Clayton and
Federal Trade Commission Acts.
The Supreme Court has held 68 that, since the act is concerned with
discriminations where the effect "may be" to injure competition, it is
not necessary for the Federal Trade Commission to prove actual injury
to competition. The court further held that the requirements of the
act are met by an "inference" that discriminations constitute "a substantial threat to competition." 64
The far-reaching potentialities of subordinating the competitive
· effect provision of the Robinson-Patman Act have been somewhat
restri~ted ~y the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the Morton Salt .
case.05 The court interpreted the Supreme Court's ruling as implicitly
conditioned on the probability that favored customers would use their
advantages for the purposes of price-cutting, and on. the probability that
82 Hearings before House Committee on H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d sess., pp.
355, 469 (1936). For interesting discussion of "like 'grade and quality," see WASHINGTON PosT, THE RoBINSON-PATMAN AcT, ITS HISTORY AND PROBABLE MEANING
16 (1936), citing W. A. Thorp.
88 Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726,
65 S.Ct. 961 (1945).
64 Cf. the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of requisite competitive effect
under § 3 of the Clayton Act and § I of the Sherman Act. It was held that "it is
unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market." International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, (U.S. 1947) 68 S.Ct. 12 at 15.
85
(C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 949, cert. granted January 12, 1948 •.
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such price-cutting would force non-favored custom:ers to reduce their
prices in order to stay in competition. The court also held that the
commission's inference can he rebutted by proof that there has been
no price-cutting or that the financial returns of non-favored customers
have not suffered in comparison with those of favored customers.
The commission had given cognizance to these contentions in
earlier decisions and had denied their validity.66 Whether or not
favored purchasers actually use discriminations to win business away
from non-favored' purchasers -by price-cutting is immaterial, the commission holds, because the favored purchasers' greater margins of profit
give them advantages which may be used in other ways to strengthen
their competitive standings. The favored purchasers can re-invest
their added profits in increased salaries, expanded sales and service
forces, more extensive advertising, improved premises, and other factors which strengthen their ability to compete against their rivals. In
the Morton case 67 it was testified that ·rebates received on certain
grocery items might be used for price-cutting on important other items
having a greater consumer acceptance. In the Curtiss cas~ 68 it has been
testified that favored vending machine operators were able by virtue
of better prices to outbid non-favored competitors for the most advantageous vending machine locations in railroad depots and other

public places.
In the Morton Salt case it is the commission's position that evidence
of comparative gross sales and net income of favored and non-favored
purchasers when offered by respondents to rebut an inference of competitive injury, is inconclusive and of no particular probative significance. Actual gain or loss of business is dependent- upon the complex
interplay of many factors, such as the particular initiative of each
competitor, the favorable location of his place of business, success in
advertising, superior service, and general growth of his particular
market. The actual loss of business produced by discriminations can
seldom be measured in restrospect through the financial statements of
the purchasers concerned.
These issues bear materially on the practical enforceability of the
Robinson-Patman Act, and are of considerable importance to the ultimate significance of the act. If the Suprem_e Court affirms the commis66 Simmons Co,, 29 F.T.C. 727 (1939); American Maize Products Co., 32
F.T.C. 901 (1941); Morton Salt Co., ibid. See also Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co., F.T.C. Doctrine No. 4920, order issued January 26, 1948.
67
Morton Salt Co., ibid.
68
Ibid.
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sion on each, the way may be opened to the eventual conclusion that,
once all of the elements are present which make a price differential a
discrimination, such discrimination is unlawful per se, within whatever
limitations the commission may impose. 69
-Price discriminations may occur on items which represent only a
small part of a purchaser's total operating costs; or may be so small
in amount as to affect only a small part of total costs. The Federal
Trade Commission has not yet evolved a conclusive principle as to
the proportion of gross costs which must be affected by price discriminations in order for them to entail requisite competitive effect.
The commission has held that a price discrimination on one item
out of several thousand carried by a grocery retailer has the requisite
effect on competition. It was stated:
" . . . Of course a price differential of 2 ¼ per cent on a
single product of no greater importance than ice cream powder
is not sufficient to give The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company any appreciable competitive advantage in all of its business,
but it does receive a definite advantage in the sale of that particular commodity. The competitive advantage becomes the
greater when a company doing a Nation-wide business is permitted to obtain a 2¼ percent differential from a considerable
number of sellers. Even though individually they are of relatively
little importance, the sum of the differentials would undoubtedly
give the buyer a decided competitive advantage. . . ." 70
The commission has also held that price discriminations are unlawful on glucose, constituting an important percentage of the weight
of candy; on yeast, which represents a significant cost in the manufacture of bread; on enamd, which represents an important cost in
the manufacture of certain household fixtures and appliances; and on
oil burner controls, which represent up to 40 per cent of the "materials
cost" in the manufacture of oil burners.71 Pending complaints concern
69 Cf. the objections of Dr. Corwin D. Edwards, N.Y. STATE BAR AssN., RoBINsoN-PATMAN AcT SYMPOSIUM 57 at 58 (1947), in his recommendations concerning
sound relationship of the anti-trust laws to pricing.
70 H. C. Brill Co., 26 F.T.C. 666 at 680 (1938). See also Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4920, order issued January 26, 1948. 71 Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726, 65
S.Ct. 961 (1945); Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S.
746, 65 S.Ct. 971 (1945); 34 F.T.C. 1362 (1942); American Maize-Products Co.,
32 F.T.C. 901 (1941); Hubinger Co., 32 F.T.C. 1 II6 (1941); Standard Brands,
Inc., 30 F.T.C. 1II7 (1940); Republic Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 701 (1941); National Grain Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 684 (1941); Federal Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C.
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price discriminations in the sale of liquid carbon dioxide to soft drink
bottlers; in the sale of dry ice to manufacturers and retailers of frozen
foods. 72 It is probable that the commission will extend the principle
of the Brill case to these latter situations, and will hold the discriminations unlawful, regardless of the fact that the items involved do not
represent major proportions of the total operating costs of the purchasers concerned.
However, the commission in two decisions has indicated that the
size of price discriminations is material in determining their effect upon
competition for purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act. In the Morton
Salt case 78 the modified order to cease and desist permitted discriminations of less tha; five cents per case of salt, except in particular situations where discriminations of even that size might "tend to lessen,
injure or destroy competition." The cost of a case of "Blue Label"
salt was $1.50. In the Kraft-Phenix case 74 one ground on which a
·discount was upheld was that it did not aggregate more than $6.50
per year to each favored purchaser.
The commission has not clarified its principles as to the size of
differential it will permit under section 2 (a) of the act. Such considerations are valid only where it is certain that discounts of given
size, in per unit terms, are not sufficiently large to be effectively used
for purposes of price-cutting. Once satisfied on this matter, it would
appear necessary to ascertain the significance of the discounts in terms
of aggregates realizable by favored purchasers after multiplying the
per unit discounts by actual or prospective volume of purchases.
Uniformity and objectivity of analysis might require some.common
standard by which all cases could be measured. One relationship, common to all cases and having direct significance to the problem involved,
is that of the aggregate amount realizable by a favored purchaser in
comparison with net income, actual or prospective, for the period in
question. Where the article in a particular case is only one of many
carried in a favored purchaser's business, net income, for the purpose
1372 (1941); Ferro Enamel Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. 5155, order issued Feb. 26,
1946; Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4920, order issued
January 26, 1948.
72
Pure Carbonic, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. 5143, complaint issued March 29,
1944.
78
(C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 949, affirming 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944), order
modified April 14, 1945.
74
25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). The order in Curtiss Candy Co., F.T.C. Docket No.
4673, order issued Nov. 12, 1947, permits discriminations of ¾ cent per case of 24
candy bars.
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of the relationship, might be reduced by applying the proportion which
the total costs of the article for the period in question bear to the gross
expenses of the business. The same basis could be applied where the
article is purchased for reprocessing into a subsequent article.
A different type of issue concerning requisite effect on competition
is whether a non-favored purchaser is injru:ed by the price discrimination of a particular seller if he can obtain goods of like grade and
quality at the favorable pric~ from another seller. It may be that
competition is not injured if purchasers can get articles conforming to
the same specifications, or of equal performance, from other sources
at the lower price.
_
,
However, where a seller's product carries a valuable trade name,
the availability of products of like grade and quality from other sources
does not destroy the competitive effects of a discrimination. In the
Standard Oil case 75 it was shown that less well-known brand gasolines
were available at lower prices to Standard Oil customers and were of
like grade and quality as Standard's ''Red Crown," "Stanolind," and
other brands. The majority of the commission felt that the good will
attached to Standard's brand· names made the less well-known brands
unacceptable as substitutes to the non-favored purchasers.
It is quite possible that more consideration must be given relative
to the effect on competition where injury to a seller's own competitors,
or first line competition, is. concerned. It would seem probable that
some showing of hardship on competitors in meeting a seller's discriminatory price is required, and the tests of injury to competition
may be more siinilar to those of section 3 of the Clayton Act. The cases
concerning first line competition have not been inconsistent with this
suggestion. In the Moss case 76 it was' shown that at least one competitor was forced out of business, and that others were unable to
match the special prices of Moss and make a profit. In the Muller
case 11 sales were made below cost in New Orleans fo~ the express
purpose ~f driving a competitor in that city out of business. However,
in the Minneapolis-Honeywell case the commission's discussion of injury to first-line competition reflected no particular conviction that the
tests of injury, to such competition differed materially from those of
injury to second-line competition.
75

Case No. 92u, C.C.A. 7th, F.T.C. Docket No. 4389, modified order issued
Aug. 9, 1946. See also Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., F.T.C. Docket No.
4920, order issued January 25, 1948.
76
(C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 155 F. (2d) 1016, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 378,
36 F.T.C. 640 (1943).
77
(C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 5u.
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4. Justifications under the section 2 (a} provisos
Price discriminations under certain circumstances are not prohibited
by the Robinson-Patman Act. These circumstances are set forth in a
group of provisos to section :2(a), the most important of which is the
so-called "due allowance" proviso. This reads:
"That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manu-.
facture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or
quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold
or delivered...."
This proviso is followed by a provision.' empowering the Federal
Trade Commission to fix and establish quantity limits beyond which
differences justified by cost shall not be permissible. The commission
has, as yet, taken no affirmative action to fix or establish any such quantity limit.
Section 2{ a) also contains a proviso, previously referred to, concerning the selection of customers,78 and concludes with the following
proviso:

"And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent price changes from time to time where in response to
changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability
of the goods concerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal
goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith
in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned."
This provision has not been invoked in any of the recorded cases so
far.
The Federal Trade Commission seems to have tacitly assumed
that the section 2 (a) provisos constitute affirmative defenses, under
which the burden of proof is on respondents who seek to invoke them. 79
There is some support for this view in Congressional interpretation.80
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, in the Morton Salt
78

"Di~rimination in price affecting third line competition," supra, p. 461.
Standard Brands, Inc., 30 F.T.C. I 117 (1940); Standard Oil Co., Case No.
9211, C.C.A. 7th, F.T.C. Docket No. 4389, modified order issued Aug. 9, 1946;
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4920, order issued January 26, 1948; U.S. Rubber Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4972, complaint issued June
I, 1943.
so 80 CoNG. REc. 9418 (1936); S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936).
See also infra, note 87.·
79
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case,81 declared its unpreparedness to accept such conclusion. The
court made no final determination on the matter, but held that, whatever the procedural significance of the provisos, a respondent's burden
could be met by an inference of fact. It held that the commission
should have recognized such inference under the circumstances of the
Morton Salt case.
·
When the Robinson-Patman Act was passed, it was forecast that
the due allowance proviso would stimulate extensive cost accounting
in the distribution and marketing field. This has not eventuated. Management, in general, has not yet devoted the refined attention to distribution costs required by the act. The Federal Trade Commission has
been required to make only a few interpretations as to acceptable cost
accounting for purposes of the act. As a consequence, there are few
specifically approved principles to serve as guides in a rather complex
field, which involves the assignment of joint costs arising out of
the activities of sales organizations, b_illing departments, and shipping
rooms. 82 Eventually there may evolve from the decisions a recognized
system, or systems, of accounting which may be used by sellers who
wish to pass the benefit of cost savings to their customers.
The problem of accounting for distribution costs is an intensely
practical, as well as interpretive, one. Disproportionate effort and expense involved in keeping accurate cost records constitutes a permanent
obstacle to fullest realization of justifiable price differentiation based on
savings in cost. It may be in recognition of the practical difficulties involved that it has been unofficially indicated that the Federal Trade
Commission may accept cost justification based on sample experience,
and cost justification based on average costs of serving typical classes
of customers.88 It is believed, however, that the commission would be
, willing to accept such type of cost justification only so long as good
81 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 949. Petition for certiorari filed December
2, 1947. See also 80 CONG. REc. 8452 (1936).
82 For discussion of distribution cost accounting problems, see Sawyer, "The Commission's Administration of Paragraph 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act: An Appraisal," 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 469 at 478 ff. (1940); Warmack, "Cost Accounting
Problems under the Robinson-Patman Act," N.Y. STATE BAR AssN., ROBINSON-PATMAN
AcT SYMPOSIUM 105 (1947); and Massel, "Cost Factors Considered under the Due
Allowance Clause of Section 2(a) of the Act as Justification for Price Differences"
(before Chicago Bar Association Symposium, Jan. 24, 1947).
83
Freer, "Accounting Problems under the Robinson-Patman Act'' (before the
Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public Accountants, March 24, 1938); Woodrum,
"Robinson-Patman Act" (before The Virginia Association of Retail Clothiers, Feb. 22,
1937). Cf. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 4920, order
issped January 26, 1948.
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faith effort under current operating conditions was reflected. It would
be necessary that sample experiences be kept current, and that classifications be reasonably related to differences in typical sales effort and
representative of all individuals within each class.
The due allowance proviso permits differentials based on differences
in cost "resulting'' from differing "methods" or "quantities" in which
commodities are "sold or delivered." Therefore, according to Congressional opinion, reduced manufacturing cost resulting from volume
of production made possible by a single purchaser's large business
cannot be made the basis for a reduced price to such customer under
the proviso.8 '
Under section 2 ( c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, a seller is not
permitted to justify a price discrimination by showing that the dis- ·
crimination makes only due allowance for a savings in brokerage costs.85
In a pending case 86 it is argued that cost justifications may not be
relied upon as a defense where there is evidence that other purchasers
have not been accorded opportunity on proportionally equal terms
to take advantage of the methods of sale or delivery resulting in such
cost savings. It may be that under section 2(e) of the act, and in some
cases under section 2(d), a seller must accord, on proportionally equal
terms, all buyers the oppotf:unity of taking advantage of methods of
sale or delivery which result in cost savings. It would appear, however, that such issues under sections 2 ( e) and 2 ( d) are collateral to
the validity of the cost savings as a defense in section 2 (a) cases, and
that cost justifications are admissible in section 2 (a) proceedings, regardless of the fact that a seller may have violated sections 2 ( e) and
2 ( d) in connection therewith.

II
SECTION 2 (b)

Section 2(b), because of ambiguous draftsmanship, has probably
provoked greater controversy than is warranted by the section's subject
matter. Section 2(b) provides:
84
S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (1936); H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th
Cong., 2d sess. (1936); H. Hearings on H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d sess. 256 (1936);
80 CONG. REC. 9417 (1936).
85 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 3d,
1939) 106 F. (2d) 667, cert. den., 308 U.S. 625, 60 S.Ct. 380 (1940).
86
Automatic Canteen Co., F.T.C. ,Docket No. 4933, complaint issued March
19, 1943, Brief for Commission, pp. 59 ff. See also Curtiss Candy Co., F.T.C.
Docket No. 4673, order issued Nov. 12, 1947. Brief for Commission, pp. 67 ff.
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"Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under
this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services
or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie
case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person
charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification
shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue
an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however,
· That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting
the prinia-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price
or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competi!or."

It is believed that Congress intended section 2 (b) only as a supplement to section 2 (a), adding another proviso to those incorporated
within the text of section 2 (a), and assuring that the provisos were to
be regarded as affirmative defenses in administrative proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission.87 However, the phrasing of the
section in the terms of "prima-facie" case and "rebuttal" has evoked
issues as to whether the Federal Trade Commission can make out a
prima facie case of violation of section 2 (a) by mere proof of a price
·discrimination, and as to whether proof of meeting the equally low
price of a competitor is a substantive defense under the act.
The prima facie case
Whether the Federal.Trade Commission's proceedings under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act are facilitated by means of a
prima facie case under section 2 (b) is n~t of too great practical significance to the commission, if the commission's position as to the elements of requisite competitive effect under section 2 (a) is sustained.
- The commission has never relied on its interpretation of a prima facie
'case as defined in the Standard Oil findings to support a conclusion of
unlawful price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act. It has
always considered it a part of its burden to show as a matter of fact
that the price differentials tended to injure, destroy, or prevent competition. However, if the commission's reversal in the Morton Salt
case 88 on the matter of requisite injury to competition is upheld, the
concept of the prima facie case may become of substantial practical
w-0.rth to the commission and may be affirmatively invoked in section
2 (a) proce.edings.
The matter of the prima facie case has been given attention at the
I.

87
118

80 CoNG. ·REc. 9418 (193M. See also supra, note 80. ·
(C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 16:z. F. (zd) 949, cert. granted January
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present time, because it is a necessary corollary of the commission's
position that the section 2 (b) proviso, concerning the meeting of a
competitor's equally low price, is merely procedural and does not
constitute a substantive defense. 89 Also, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has interpreted section 2 (b) relative to a prima facie case, and,
if the language of the court's opinion is to be read literally, has construed the prima facie case more liberally than contended by the commission.90 The court said:
" ••• Congress adopted the common device •.. of shifting the
burden of proof to anyone who sets two prices, and who probably
knows why he has done so, and what has been the result. If he
can prove that the lower price did not prevent or tend to prevent
anyone from taking away the business; he will succeed, for the
accuser will not then have brought him within the statute at

all. • • ·" 91
It may be the court's position that the commission's prima facie
case consists of mere proof of a price difference. From such proof
the commission may presume the existence of competition which might
be affected, and the requisite effect on such competition.
It is doubtful whether Congress anticipated the current contention
concerning the prima facie case. No attention is directed to any procedural significance of the so-called prima facie case in the Congressional reports and debates}' 2 It may be that Congress used the word
"discrimination" and the phrase "prima-facie case" in section 2 (b) to
refer to the commission's complete cause of action, including effect on
competition. It is to be noted that section· 2 (b) refers to "rebutting
the prima-facie case .•• by showing justification." In strict legal theory,
a prima facie case is one in which a certain fact or facts are proved by
a presumption drawn from the existence of other facts. A prima facie
case is "rebutted" by advancing sufficient evidence of the non-existence
of the disputed fact ·or facts to overcome the presumption. A "justification," on the other hand, does not deny and rebut any necessary
facts in a cause of action, but "confesses" the existence of all required
facts and "avoids" their result by proof of additional facts which excuse
or extenuate. Therefore, it may be that the words "discriminate" and
"prima:..facie case" as used in section 2(b) can be properly understood only in their entire context in the st~tute.
811

See infra, note 96.

90 Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 155
F; (2d) 1016, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 378.
01
148 F. (2d) 378 at 379.
93
See supra, ~otes So, 81 and 87.
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The pending Automatic Canteen case,9 8 raises the 'question whether
the prima facie case provision of section 2 (b) of ·the Robinson-Patman
· Act applies to section 2 ( f). Section 2 ( f) makes it unlawful "knowingly" to induce or receive "a discrimination in price" prohibited by the
act. Since' a buyer's inducement of a discriminatory price is unlawful
only where done "knowingly," there are convincing reasons for believing that the prima facie case, as interpreted in the Standard Oil decision,
is not applicable to section 2 ( f) proceedings. Neither the commission
nor the intervening National Candy Wholesalers Association take the
position in the Automatic Canteen case that the commission's· case consists of anything less than the full cause of action under section 2 (a).
An interesting issue in the Automatic Canteen case is whether,
since. section 2(f) is concerned only with price discriminations "prohibited by" the act, it is necessary further for the Federal Trade
Commission to prove absence of cost justification or other affirmative
defense in proceedings against purchasers. It would not appear that
the act was intended to place such a burden on the commission. However, the burden is an inequitable one on the purchasers also. Perhaps
the commission is required to j oi,n sellers with purchasers in section
2 ( f) proceedings, so that the burden of proving affirmative defenses
can rest on sellers, who have the necessary information to make such
proof.
2. The section 2 ( b) proviso
The defense of meeting an equally low price of a competitor has
been invoked in several important section 2(a) proceedings.94 The
Federal Trade Commission, after failing to take advantage of earlier
opportunities,95 is now attempting to nullify this defense by establishing that its purpose is merely procedural. According to the commission in the Standard Oil case,96 proof of meeting a competitor's
price is not a substantive defense, but is merely a means of rebutting
the commission's prima facie case, and of forcing the commission to
proof of competitive injury wherever the commission may have rested
98

11

F.T.C. Docket No. 4933, complaint issued March 19, 1943.
A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 65 S.Ct. 971 (1945); 34 F:T.C. 1362
(1942); Standard Oil Co., Case No. 92u, C.C.A. 7th, F.T.C. Docket No. 4389,
modified order issued Aug. 9, 1946; Cement Institute, Nos. 23-34, October Term,
1947, Supreme Court of the United States; Aetna Portlarid Cement Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 157 F. (2d) 533, 37 F.T.C. 87 (1943).
95
It is to be noted that the commission has not asserted that the 2 (b) Proviso
is procedural in its brief in the pending Cement Institute case before the Supreme
Court (Brief, pp. 112-u7). A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., ibid.
96
Case No. 92u, C.C.A. 7th, F.T.C. Docket No. 4389, modified order issued
Aug. 9, 1946.
94
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on its priina fade case. In connection with this point in the Standard
Oil case, the commission said:·

.

" ... If proof of good faith in meeting an equally low price
of a competitor is made, the Commission could no longer rely
upon its prima f acie case, but must show by additional and affirmative evidence that the effect of the discrimination may be to . . .
injure ... competition.... Where such injurious effect on competition is affirmatively proved, the proof made as to meeting an
equally low price of a competitor under the proviso of Section
97
2 (b) does not constitute a substantive justification or defense."
There is some support for the commission's position in the language
used by Representative Utterback in his interpretation of the Act to
Congress.98 However, once again viewing statements in their entire
context, it can be demonstrated that Congressman Utterback probably
understood the proviso as substantive in nature. The remarks appear
actually directed at the matter of "good faith" under the proviso,
rather than at the issue whether the proviso is substantive or procedural.99
The fact that a seller in setting a discriminatory price may be meeting the price of a competitor does not indicate that the effect of such
seller's discrimination may not be to injure competition. Thus, proof
of meeting an equally low price of a competitor is not a logical rebuttal
of a presumptio'.n of injury to competition drawn from the prima facie
case. Introduction of such proof for a mere procedural purpose appears
impractical from the standpoint of Robinson-Patman Act administration, because it needlessly complicates proceedings under the act. Furthermore, in an earlier precedent, the Supreme Court held that a
state anti-price-discrimination statute was unconstitutional because it
did not permit sellers to adjust their prices to local competitive conditions as a substantive defense. 10° For these reasons it is believed that
the contention of the comm1ss1on appears headed for defeat in the
courts.
97

Id. at 15.
"This provision is entirely procedural. It does not determine substantive rights,
liabilities and duties." 80 CoNG. REC. 9418 (June 15, 1936).
99
Congressman Utterback states that meeting an equally low price of a competitor
is not "an absolute bar" to a prosecution, and that it is "a question of fact to be determined in each case, whether the competition to be met was such as to justify the
discrimination given. . . • As in any case of self-defense, while the attack against
which the defense is claimed may be shown in evidence, its competency as a bar depends also upon whether it was a legal or illegal attack." 80 CoNG. REc. 9418 (1936).
10
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. State of Minnesota, 274 U.S. I, 47 S.Ct. 506
(1927).
98
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has already held that the
section z(b) proviso, concerning the meeting of an equally low price
of a competitor, constitutes a substantive defense. The Supreme Court,
in the A. E. Staley case,101 may have concurred. In the Staley case the
section 2 (b) proviso was not challepged as procedural. However, the
implication of the Supreme Court's opinion is that the proviso is
substantive. The Supreme Court stated that the sole issue was whether
Staley had "succeeded in justifying'' its price discriminations by proof
of meeting competitors' prices in good faith. The Federal Trade Commission had not relied on its prima facie case, but had specifically
proved _the requisite effect of Staley's price discriminations on competition. The commission's findings were specifically affirmed by both
the Seventh Circuit Court and by the Supreme Court. Iµ view of this
proof, it would have been wholly irrelevant to consider competitors'
prices if such proof were merely procedural in effect. The conclusion
seems inescapable that the Supreme Court by inference determined
that the section 2 (b) proviso constituted an affirmative defense.
In the Moss case 102 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was specific
in holding that the section 2 (b) proviso was substantive. The court
declared:
·
" . . . Although it will then appear that he has lessened, or
prevented, competition, the proviso of § 2 (b) will still excuse
him, if he can show that his lower price did not undercut his
competitors, but merely 'met' their 'equally low price.' In short,
that is a defence to the violation of § 2 (a). This is as we interpret§ 2(a) and§ 2(b), when read together...." 108
In view of these precedents of the Stale:y and Moss cases, it seems
predictable that the commission's position in the Standard Oil case that
the section z(b) proviso is merely procedural will be overruled. The
rejection of this position will probably result in the subsidence of most
of the current debate concerning the prima facie case.104
Sellers are permitted by the section 2 (b) proviso to show that
101

324 U.S. 746, 65 S.Ct. 971 (1945); 34 F.T.C. 1362 (1942).
(C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 155 F. (2d) 1016, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d)
378, 36 F.T.C. 640 (1943). For fuller commentary on the Moss case relative to
§ 2(b), see Austern, "Required Competitive Injury and Permitted Meeting of Competition," N.Y. STATE BAR AsSN., ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYMPOSIUM 63 (1947).
108
148 F. (2d) 378 at 379.
.
10 ' It is pointed out in Austern, id. at 75 that § 2(b) applies to § 2(e) proceedings, as well as to § 2(a) proceedings. Section 2(e) contains no requirement
of effect on competition. Therefore, § 2(b) would have no logical connection with
§ 2(e) if merely procedural as interpreted in the Standard Oil case.
102
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their lower prices were set "in good faith" to meet the equally low
prices of competitors. "Good faith," as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in the Staley case, apparently means good faith in adherence to
the objectives of the Robinson-Patman Act. Thus the Court declared
that the section 2(b) proviso is concerned primarily with competitive
conditions which a seller may encounter in individual situations, and
that in lowering his price to meet a given competitive price the seller
must keep in mind his obligations under the act to treat his other
customers equitably. It may be that in many situations a seller may
not meet a competitor's lower price without extending the advantages
of that price to all of his customers affected.10G
The Supreme Court held that the prices under Staley's basing point
system were not set in good faith to meet competitors' prices, because
the prices were predetermined by use of an unfair system of pricing.
Under this system, the Court held, Staley took advantage of higher
competitors' prices charged certain customers to raise its own prices
to the same customers. The argument was made that a seller could
raise his price so high that competitors' prices would always be lower,
and that every sale could thereby be justified by the existence of a
lower price of a competitor. The court rejected this argument by
saying, that such an artifically high price would not be ,set in "good
faith" and that "good faith" would never be interpreted in such a way
that it would vitiate the whole purpose of the Robinson-Patm'an Act.
It is to be noted that in Congressman Utterback's discussion of
justification permitted by the section 2 (b) proviso, he states that a
seller may meet the local price offered by a local competitor, but may
not meet a nation-wide price offered by a nationwide competitor.100
It is possible that the Supreme Court will concur in this view.
In both the Staley and the Moss 101 cases it was held that a seller
may inadvertently undercut a competitor's price if he attempts in good
faith only to meet the competitor's price. However, the seller must -be
reasonable in his belief as to the existence of the competitor's price
and as to what that price is. In the Staley case the Supreme Court
found that the seller was not reasonable and did not act in good faith
in granting discounts on the basis of "verbal information received from
salesmen, brokers, or intending purchasers, without supporting evilOG For fuller discussion of "good faith" under § 2(b), see McCollester, "Section
2{b)," N.Y. STATE BAR AssN., RoBINSON-PATMAN AcT SMYl'OSIUM 23 at 26 (1946).
106
80 CoNG. Rxc. 9418 (1936). See supra, note 99.
101
(C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 155 F. (2d) I016, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 378,
36 F.T.C. 640 (1943).
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dence" and with "no efforts by respondents to investigate or verify
them."
It is probable that the seller neeq. not always go as low as the competitor's price in order to combat it, but need make only a price concession within the limit established by the competitor. The determinative consideration in each case is probably the seller's good faith, based
on the hardship of the seller's situation and on fairness to customers
who might be affected by the seller's discrimination. In some industries goods of high quality, with higher costs of manufacture, are in
competition with cheaper goods. A price concession may restore the
balance in favor of the seller as against the considerably lower price
of the competitor's inferior product. The same argument seems justified as to articles of higher price based on greater public acceptance,
even though costs of manufacture may not substantially differ between
the seller's product and that of the competitor.1°8
Section 2 (b) speaks in terms of discrimination "in price or services
or facilities furnished," and of rebutting the prima facie case by showing that the lower price "or the furnishing of services or facilities" was
made to meet "the services or facilities furnished by a competitor."
This extends the application of section 2 (b) to section 2{ e) of the
statute, and possibly also to section 2(d). It is probable that a seller is
permitted to justify a lower price on the basis of meeting a competitor's services and facilities, and, conversely, is permitted to justify
services and facilities on the basis of the competitor's lower price, in
each situation the justification turning on "good faith."
Under the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Acts sellers
have been restrained from acting in concert to suppress competition in
price. The Robinson-Patman Act is directed at unfair competition in
price and at unfair advantage in price in its aspect of cost to purchasers.
There are potentialities in the act which might have far-reaching effects
in the American economic scene. How far these potentialities may be
realized depends on the act's development during the coming few
years. The cases now before the Federal Trade Commission and the
courts will be of key significance in determining the course, toward or
a~ay from, such potentialities.
108 Cf. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., ~.T.C. Docket No. 4920, order
issued January 26, 1948. The commission in this case is concerned with the seller's
"good faith."

